



BANQUE D'INVESTISSEMENT ET DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA CEDEAO
ECOWAS BANK FOR INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
BANCO DE INVESTIMENTO E DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA CEDEAO

WEST AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK

Distant tremors, familiar shocks

June 2026





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
ABBREVIATIONS

AEs	Advanced Economies
AES	Alliance des États du Sahel (Alliance of Sahel States)
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
EAC-5	East African Community (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi)
EBID	ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMDEs	Emerging Market and Developing Economies
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FPI	Food Price Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
ROWA	Rest of West Africa
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
WADO	West African Development Outlook
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone
WAMZ+	WAMZ plus Cabo Verde
WTO	World Trade Organisation



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FOREWORD



West African countries ended 2025 on a quite positive note, with almost all macroeconomic indicators pointing in the desired direction. This was one of the most impressive macroeconomic results in a long while in normal times. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew modestly by 4.8 per cent, average inflation declined markedly by almost nine percentage points to 16.8 per cent, fiscal balance narrowed to -2.6 per cent of GDP, debt eased to 49.3 per cent of GDP, and current account balance improved to a surplus of 1.8 per cent of GDP. This provided a strong foundation for continued economic growth in.

However, the shockwaves of the war in the Middle East have cast a doubt about continued socioeconomic progress, as earlier envisaged for 2026. The Strait of Hormuz has become the nerve centre of this war. As a critical choke-point for seaborne supplies of crude oil, liquefied natural gas, and fertilisers, among others, the Strait plays a major role in global trade. The imposed blockade has restricted the supply of these critical commodities, resulting in price increases and triggering fiscal measures to mitigate the economic hardships on the citizenry. The prices of petroleum products have increased, as have fertilisers, owing to the evident reduction in shipping in the Strait. This has had inflationary effects in some West African countries.

West African countries closed 2025 on a quite positive note, with almost all macroeconomic indicators pointing in the desired direction. This was one of the most impressive results in a long while in normal times.

The US dollar strengthened after the war began, leading to currency weakening across the sub-region. A high import bill, driven mainly by energy and food-related imports, a bearish gold price and softening demand for key exports are risks to gross international reserves, unleashing another layer of pressure on domestic currencies. High energy and food prices, along with currency depreciation, are ingredients for inflation, which will, in turn, affect the fiscal balance through subsidies, tax reductions, and direct procurement costs, potentially leading to increased borrowing.

The war in the Middle East may be far from the sub-region, but its ramifications are all too familiar. This explains the title of the 2026 West African Development Outlook (WADO), “**Distant tremors, familiar shocks**”. The title communicates that the shocks the war has unleashed upon the sub-region are not too different from those the war in Ukraine occasioned in 2022-2024 or those COVID-19 brought to bear in 2020-2023. The regions may be different and distant, but the shocks are similar and familiar.

This explains the title of the 2026 West African Development Outlook (WADO), “**Distant tremors, familiar shocks**”. The title communicates that the shocks the war has unleashed upon the sub-region are not too different from those the war in Ukraine occasioned in 2022-2024 or those COVID-19 brought to bear in 2020-2023.

In spite of the challenges the war has exposed in the sub-region, there is a silver lining on the horizon. Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent, is almost self-sufficient in fertiliser production, and has the capacity to supply some refined petroleum to the sub-region. The countries in the sub-region, having been hit continuously by external shocks over the past six years, have a unique opportunity to coalesce around improving intra-regional trade, beginning with basic needs such as refined petroleum products, fertiliser, and food. Aside from proximity considerations, this will insulate the sub-region from the direct impacts of shocks originating beyond the continent, while reducing transportation and freight costs.

Beyond short-term fiscal interventions by governments, it is imperative to give careful thought to developing local capacities for crude oil refining, fertiliser manufacturing, and food production for medium- to long-term sovereignty. After all, shocks are here to stay.

Dr. George Agyekum Donkor

President and Chairman of the Board of Directors





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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS	i
FOREWORD	ii
LIST OF FIGURES	02
LIST OF BOXES	03
HIGHLIGHTS	04
STEADY GROWTH, REMARKABLE PRICE DECLINE	08
A PROMISING BUT FRAGILE OUTLOOK.....	18
UPSIDE POTENTIAL	23
DOWNSIDE RISKS	25
A DISTANT WAR, FAMILIAR SHOCKS	28
BUILDING RESILIENCE	33
REFERENCES	35
COUNTRY BRIEFS.....	36
ANNEXURES	52



LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1:	Global GDP growth	09
Figure 2:	SSA sub-regional growth	09
Figure 3:	West African countries' growth	10
Figure 4:	Distribution of West African GDP	10
Figure 5:	Global average inflation	10
Figure 6:	Food Price Index	11
Figure 7:	SSA sub-regional average inflation	11
Figure 8:	Average inflation in West Africa	11
Figure 9:	End-of-period inflation in West Africa	12
Figure 10:	Fiscal balance in groupings	12
Figure 11:	Fiscal balance in Member States	12
Figure 12:	Growth in revenue and expenditure	13
Figure 13:	Public debt.....	13
Figure 14:	Current account balance	14
Figure 15:	Unemployment in West Africa	14
Figure 16:	Annual productivity growth rate of output per worker	15
Figure 17:	Working poverty in West Africa	15
Figure 18:	GDP growth: 2025-2027	19
Figure 19:	Average inflation: 2025-2027	19
Figure 20:	Fiscal balance: 2025-2027	20
Figure 21:	Debt-to-GDP ratio: 2025-2027.....	20
Figure 22:	Current account balance: 2025-2027	21
Figure 23:	Unemployment: 2025-2027	21
Figure 24:	Labour productivity growth: 2025-2027.....	22
Figure 25:	Gold price trends.....	26
Figure 26:	Daily crude oil outbound shipments through the Strait of Hormuz	29
Figure 27:	Daily volume of fertiliser-related outbound shipments through the Strait of Hormuz	29
Figure 28:	Currency performance since the war in the Middle East	30
Figure 2.1:	Brent crude oil price	32

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1: Debt crises – Ghana vs. Senegal.....16

Box 2: Timeline and Impacts of the War in the Middle East.....31



BANQUE D'INVESTISSEMENT ET DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA CEDEAO
ECOWAS BANK FOR INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
BANCO DE INVESTIMENTO E DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA CEDEAO

HIGHLIGHTS

Performance

West Africa achieved stellar macroeconomic results in 2025, underpinned by healthy growth in economic activity, decelerating inflation, a narrowing fiscal deficit, improving debt, and a higher current account surplus. GDP grew by a modest 4.8 per cent, up from 4.7 per cent in 2024, supported by a recovery in agriculture, commodity exports and increased services sector activity. Average inflation plummeted to 16.8 per cent, down from 25.3 per cent in 2024, supported by falling food and energy prices and stable currencies. Fiscal balance eased to -2.6 per cent of GDP in 2025, compared to -3.7 per cent in 2024, helped by improved revenue mobilisation, expenditure cuts and reduced interest costs in some countries. In line with this, public debt declined markedly to 49.3 per cent of GDP, down from 55.3 per cent in 2024, on account of nominal GDP growth recovery, increased export revenues, and improved fiscal deficit. The current account balance extended its surplus stint to 1.8 per cent of GDP, from a modest 0.3 per cent in 2024, as a result of increased export receipts and lower imports.

Outlook

Growth is projected to slow to 4.7 per cent in 2026 and rebound to 4.9 per cent in 2027, mainly as a result of inflationary pressures occasioned by the war. The pace of inflation decline is projected to slow, with an average inflation of 11.1 per cent projected for 2026 and 10.2 per cent for 2027, mainly as a result of the undercurrents of the war in the Middle East. Fiscal balance is expected to worsen to -3.5 per cent of GDP in 2026, partly as a result of subsidies and tax cuts to mitigate high food and energy prices, before improving to -2.9 per cent in 2027. Public debt is projected to continue on a declining trend to 45.9 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 45.0 per cent in 2027, while the current account balance improves to 3.2 per cent of GDP in 2026 before declining to 1.8 per cent in 2027.

Upside potential

The year 2026 got off to a rocky start due to the war in the Middle East, leading to downward revisions to growth projections. While challenges remain, there are probable tailwinds that could support macroeconomic stability beyond expectations, some of which are discussed below.

- *Favourable commodity prices:* crude oil, gold and base metal prices remain elevated, bringing windfall gains to major exporters in the sub-region. This will bring fiscal and current account relief, boosting sub-regional growth.
- *Production uptick:* production capacities for extractives are being boosted by new investments, while others have been contemplated. In the near-to-medium term, increased output, together with high prices, will broaden the fiscal space and currency stability.
- *Trade:* Nigeria has exported substantial quantities of crude and refined petroleum to buyers in the sub-region, given the difficulties in global supply. In addition, fertiliser production in Nigeria has also increased and could partially fill the void created by the war in the Middle East. Increased intra-regional trade will reduce import costs and promote the growth of economic activity.

Downside risks

The sub-region faces a number of headwinds in 2026 and 2027, some of which are discussed below.

- *War-induced fiscal slippages:* many governments have introduced subsidies, while others have removed or reduced fuel taxes and levies in a bid to mitigate the impact of the high energy prices on the citizenry. This poses risks to revenue mobilisation and expenditure controls.



- *Food insecurity:* war-induced high fertiliser prices in 2026 could adversely impact food security in 2026 and 2027, which risks heightening poverty levels in the sub-region.
- *Inflation:* high food and energy prices have already fed into global and sub-regional inflation. This could derail the gains made in 2025.
- *Exchange rate pressures:* countries face higher food and energy import bills, posing risks to their reserve positions and exposing domestic currencies to depreciation pressures. This will worsen inflation in the near term.
- *Interest rate hikes:* a high inflation rate could take us back to the era of interest rate hikes a couple of years ago, raising the cost of borrowing and suppressing GDP growth.
- *Commodity price declines:* the gold price has been bearish for most of the year, mainly due to the war. If the slide continues and other key exports experience a similar trend, it will adversely affect revenues and the reserves position.
- *Widespread power outages:* Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Niger and Nigeria have all experienced electricity supplies that have been tellingly challenging in the first half of 2026. This has had a negative impact on productivity. If this continues, it could upend growth projections.

Building resilience

The war in the Middle East has led to increases in food and energy prices, stemming from restricted supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. While these raise cost-of-living concerns, the suppression of fertiliser shipments particularly raises food security fears in the near term. This is an all-too-familiar terrain, not least because a similar trend emerged during the COVID period and also during the war in Ukraine.

This makes it imperative to guard against any state of unpreparedness if similar shocks should recur in future. Governments should be intentional about expanding petroleum refining capacities in the sub-region to reduce the sub-region's over-dependence on imports from other regions. Furthermore, there is a need to increase fertiliser production to reduce imports from beyond the sub-region, thereby reducing costs and improving availability. There is also a need to build fiscal and gross international reserve buffers in readiness for unanticipated shocks.





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
STEADY GROWTH, REMARKABLE PRICE DECLINE



Mixed growth outcomes, but largely positive

The growth in global economic activity steadied at 3.4 per cent in 2025, supported by a remarkable decline in prices, in spite of the ramifications of trade fragmentation and heightened uncertainty. Global growth surpassed forecasts in 2025, driven mainly by the reversal of many injurious trade barriers that had been feared during the year and helped by tempered inflationary pressures. Advanced Economies (AEs) recorded a growth of 1.9 per cent, slightly higher than the 1.8 per cent recorded in 2024. For Emerging Market and Developing Economies (EMDEs), however, growth slowed marginally to 4.4 per cent in 2025, compared with 4.5 per cent in 2024, while Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) recorded a robust growth of 4.5 per cent, up from 4.2 per cent in 2024 (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Global GDP growth




Source: World Economic Outlook database

Economic performance in some of SSA's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) mimicked that of SSA, with overall improvements.

The East African Community (EAC-5) recorded a growth of 5.7 per cent in 2025, compared with 5.3 per cent in 2024, while the Southern African Development Community (SADC) grew by 2.9 per cent, up from 2.7 per cent in 2024. Growth in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) rebounded to 1.1 per cent in 2025, from 0.5 per cent in 2024, extending the recent low-growth trend (Figure 2).

Figure 2: SSA sub-regional growth



Source: EBID staff, based on Economic Outlook and country data.

Note: EBID staff calculated West African, WAMZ+ and AES GDPs

Decent growth in West Africa

The West African sub-region recorded a growth of 4.8 per cent in 2025, up from 4.7 per cent in 2024, despite global headwinds. This was due largely to falling inflation and improved macroeconomic management across much of the sub-region. These were, in turn, helped by favourable commodity prices, improved reserves, stable currencies, and improved food supply. Favourable commodity prices boosted extractives sector output, translating into higher revenues and providing an impulse for economic expansion.

In summary, the sub-region's remarkable growth was underpinned by:


- Macroeconomic stabilisation and easing inflation;
- Strong agriculture, mining, oil, and gas performance;
- A rebound in services sector activity and infrastructure spending; and
- domestic demand and demographic momentum.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) economy grew by 4.7 per cent in 2025, up from 4.6 per cent in 2024, while the West African

Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) maintained an impressive growth rate above 6 per cent. Growth in WAEMU was 6.4 per cent in 2025, up from 6.3 per cent in 2024, while WAMZ+ growth remained steady at 4.3 per cent. In the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), however, growth declined to 5.5 per cent, from 6.4 per cent in 2024, mainly on account of slower but decent growth in Niger.

Senegal recorded the strongest growth in the sub-region, with the surge largely supported by the ramp-up in hydrocarbon production and improved agricultural output. The country's growth reached 7.9 per cent in 2025, from 6.1 per cent in 2024. Benin recorded the second-highest growth of 7.5 per cent, similar to that of 2024. Nigeria's GDP growth of 4.0 per cent, which outperformed all forecasts, was the slowest in the sub-region (Figure 3).


Figure 3: West African countries' growth



Source: West African Development Outlook database

The regional distribution of nominal GDP has been altered by GDP growth and, to a large extent, the exchange rate dynamics in the sub-region, with Ghana and Nigeria as the main beneficiaries. Ghana's share of regional GDP improved to 16.3 per cent (15.5% in 2024), while that of Nigeria increased markedly to 41.2 per cent (35.2% in 2024). Côte d'Ivoire experienced a decline from 16.3 per cent in 2024 to 14.0 per cent in 2025, while the share of the Rest of West Africa (ROWA) reduced from 33.0 per cent in 2024 to 28.5 per cent in 2025 (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Distribution of West African GDP




Source: West African Development Outlook database

Benign global inflation

Global inflation decelerated in 2025 on account of improved supply chains, leading to stable food and energy prices. Average inflation declined to 4.1 per cent from 5.8 per cent in 2024. Advanced Economies also experienced declining inflation, with inflation averaging 2.6 per cent in 2025, down from 4.6 per cent in 2024. Average inflation in EMDEs moderated to 5.2 per cent, down from 8.0 per cent in 2024, while SSA average inflation plunged to 12.5 per cent from 20.7 per cent in 2024 (Figure 5).


Figure 5: Global average inflation



Source: World Economic Outlook database

The Food and Agriculture Organisation's (FAO) Food Price Index (FPI) exhibited an upward trend for most months in the first half of 2025, with most months experiencing a downward trend month-on-month (Figure 6). The story was not too different in year-on-year terms, with most months recording an increase in the FPI, albeit marginal. In effect, global food prices were quite stable compared to 2022 and 2023, thus supporting the overall price decline in 2025.

Figure 6: Food Price Index




Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation

Declining inflationary pattern in West Africa

In 2025, general price levels plunged in West Africa, and across all groupings (Annex 1), in line with declining energy and food prices and relative currency stability in most countries. Average inflation declined markedly to 16.8 per cent in 2025, down from 25.3 per cent in 2024, with ECOWAS experiencing a similar trend with an average inflation of 18.0 per cent in 2025 compared to 26.7 per cent in 2024. In WAEMU, inflation settled below the 3 per cent threshold at 0.2 per cent, much lower than the central bank's implicit inflation target band of 0-2%, and down from 3.3 per cent in 2024. In WAMZ+, average inflation experienced a significant drop to 21.1 per cent, down from 31.0 per cent in 2024. Inflation in the AES averaged -0.5 per cent in 2025, from 5.1 per cent in 2024 (Figure 7).

Figure 7: SSA sub-regional average inflation




Source: EBID staff, based on World Economic Outlook and country data.

Note: EBID staff calculated West African, ECOWAS, WAMZ+ and AES average inflation

Apart from Cabo Verde, Senegal, and Liberia, inflation in 2025 outperformed that of 2024 across all countries in the West African sub-region, reflecting the general decline in energy and food prices. Niger (-4.6%) recorded the lowest average inflation in the sub-region, followed by Burkina Faso (-0.5%), with Nigeria's (23%) being the highest (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Average inflation in West Africa




Source: West African Development Outlook database

Consistent with the average inflation trend, end-period inflation declined in most countries in the sub-region, with inflation slowing in 11 of 15 countries. Niger (-9.4%) experienced the lowest end-of-period inflation, followed by Guinea-Bissau (-2.8%) and

Burkina Faso (-2.2), with Nigeria (15.2%) recording the highest (Figure 9).

Figure 9: End-of-period inflation in West Africa




Source: World Economic Outlook

The EAC-5 experienced a slight uptick in average inflation in 2025, recording a 4.3 per cent increase in general price levels, up from 4.1 per cent in 2024. In SADC, average inflation moderated to 10.5 per cent, down from 22.4 per cent in 2024, while SACU's continued on a downward trend, with an average inflation of 3.2 per cent, down from 4.3 per cent in 2024.

Fiscal balance improves

Fiscal balance in West Africa narrowed to -2.6 per cent of GDP in 2025 on account of improved revenue mobilisation, expenditure controls, as well as a robust growth in economic activity. This compares favourably with -3.7 per cent of GDP in 2024. In ECOWAS, fiscal balance contracted to -2.2 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -2.6 per cent in 2024. The ratio improved to -3.7 per cent of GDP in the WAEMU, compared to -5.4 per cent in 2024. WAMZ+ fiscal balance also followed a similar trend, albeit improving marginally to -1.9 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -2.0 per cent in 2024. The AES experienced a marked improvement in fiscal balance from -4.0 per cent of GDP in 2025 to -2.7 per cent in 2024 (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Fiscal balance in groupings




Source: EBID staff, based on World Economic Outlook and country data.

Note: EBID staff calculated West Africa, WAMZ+ and AES fiscal balances


Thirteen (13) of the 15 countries recorded superior fiscal balances in 2025 compared with 2024 (Figure 11). Consistent with this, revenue growth in 13 countries exceeded expenditure growth, with Ghana and Togo recording declines in expenditure (Figure 12). Notably, Cabo Verde recorded a fiscal surplus of 1.1 per cent of GDP, while Guinea and Nigeria saw their ratios deteriorate.

Figure 11: Fiscal balance in Member States



Source: Regional Economic Outlook for SSA

Figure 12: Growth in revenue and expenditure




Source: EBID staff calculations, based on World Economic Outlook

Debt declines across countries

Debt-to-GDP ratio improved across all groupings and countries in the sub-region. West Africa's gross debt improved to 49.3 per cent of GDP in 2025 from 55.3 per cent in 2024. ECOWAS debt also declined from 48.3 per cent of GDP in 2024 to 43.2 per cent in 2025, while WAEMU debt improved from 67.5 per cent in 2024 to 64.6 per cent in 2025. WAMZ+ debt declined markedly to 37.8 per cent of GDP in 2025 from 43.5 per cent in 2024, with AES toeing the line with a 46.2 per cent debt-to-GDP ratio in 2025, from 49.4 per cent in 2024.

At the end of 2025, the debt levels of Cabo Verde (101.1% of GDP), The Gambia (73.9% of GDP), Guinea-Bissau (75.3% of GDP), and Senegal (130.2% of GDP) exceeded the ECOWAS Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria threshold of 70 per cent (Figure 13). This makes it four (4) out of 15 countries to have breached this primary criterion. However, this is better than the five in 2024.

Figure 13: Public debt



Source: West African Development Outlook database


Senegal's debt-to-GDP ratio is the highest in the sub-region, necessitating calls for restructuring which it has refused to do so far. Some analysts draw parallels between Senegal's debt situation and that of Ghana in 2022. However, even though Senegal's debt-to-GDP is higher than Ghana's at the peak of the crisis, the two situations are not necessarily the same (Box 1).

Significant current account gains

West Africa experienced marked improvements in its current account position in 2025. The current account balance improved from 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2024 to 1.8 per cent in 2025. Similarly, in ECOWAS, the current account balance was in surplus, improving from 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2024 to 2.0 per cent in 2025. The current account balance in WAEMU remained in deficit but improved markedly from -5.5 per cent of GDP in 2024 to -1.7 per cent in 2025. The current account stabilised at a surplus of 3.8 per cent of GDP in WAMZ+ in 2025, with the AES experiencing a shift from a deficit in 2024 (-4.4% of GDP) to a surplus in 2025 (0.6% of GDP). Generally favourable commodity prices provided tailwinds for the marked improvement in West Africa's current account position.

Only three (3) countries recorded a worsening in the current account position in 2025, compared with 2024. However, two (i.e. Cabo Verde and Nigeria) of the three countries recorded surpluses over the period, while four (4) countries recorded current account surpluses overall in 2025. As indicated in Figure 14, Ghana recorded the highest current account balance (i.e. 7.9% of GDP), with Guinea recording the lowest (i.e. -22.3% of GDP).

Figure 14: Current account balance




Source: World Economic Outlook

Unemployment deteriorates, growth in labour productivity slows

Unemployment in West Africa worsened marginally to 5.6 million in 2025, compared with 5.58 million in 2024. The ECOWAS result mimicked the West African result, deteriorating to 5.13 million in 2025, up from 4.94 million in 2024, while unemployment in WAMZ+ also worsened to 4.46 million in 2025, up from 4.3 million in 2024. Results from WAEMU and AES bucked the trend with WAEMU unemployment declining to 1.14 million in 2025, from 1.28 million in 2024, while the AES recorded an improvement from 0.63 million in 2024 to 0.47 million in 2025 (Annex 5).

Nigeria, due to the size of its population, recorded the highest level of unemployment of 3.6 million. However, in terms of the growth in unemployment, Niger recorded a 9.0 per cent increase in 2025 to 0.05 million. Burkina Faso's unemployment rate declined by 49 per cent in 2025 to 0.17 million (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Unemployment in West Africa




Source: ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates (Accessed 26 May 2026).

Note: West African unemployment calculated by EBID staff

Labour productivity in the sub-region and across almost all groupings deteriorated in 2025, compared to 2024. The rate of growth in West Africa slowed to 1.6 per cent in 2025, from 1.7 per cent in 2024. In ECOWAS, productivity growth stabilised at 1.6 per cent in 2025, while WAEMU's declined to 2.5 per cent, down marginally from 2.6 per cent in 2024. Labour productivity growth halved to 1.5 per cent in 2025 in AES, from 3.0 per cent in 2024, while it declined moderately to 1.3 per cent in 2025, compared with 1.4 per cent in 2024 in WAMZ+ (Annex 6). Guinea's labour productivity grew the highest in 2025 to 4.5 per cent, with Burkina Faso recording the lowest growth of 0.7 per cent in 2025 (Figure 16).

Figure 16: Annual productivity growth rate of output per worker



Source: EBID staff, based on ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates (Accessed 26 May 2026)


Note: EBID staff calculated West Africa's growth rate

Poverty deteriorates

The rate of the working poor, measured as the percentage of employed persons living below US\$3 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, deteriorated in all West African countries in 2025. Niger recorded the highest percentage of working poor, with 55.5 per cent of its working population living below US\$3 in PPP terms, up from 51.9 per cent in 2024. Cabo Verde had a working poverty rate of 6.8 per cent in 2025, up from 6.3 per cent in 2024 (Figure 17). The deteriorating poverty numbers, in spite of decent GDP growth in many countries, are a testament that the growth has not been inclusive enough.

The deteriorating poverty numbers, in spite of decent GDP growth in many countries, are a testament that the growth has not been inclusive enough.

Figure 17: Working poverty in West Africa



Source: ILOSTAT, ILO modelled estimates (Accessed 56 May 2026)



Box 1: Debt crises – Ghana vs. Senegal

Introduction

Ghana's debt crisis came immediately after the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic and not long after the war in Ukraine began. The credit rating downgrade triggered a sell-off of Ghana's bonds, which resulted in a violent currency depreciation, ballooning its debt stock and resulting in a missed debt payment in December 2022. Ghana lost access to the international capital markets at a time when food and energy prices were skyrocketing, setting in motion an inflationary trend not seen in decades. Not only that, but it also lost access to the domestic bond market (and effectively medium-to-long-term financing), limiting it to the short end of the market.

Senegal's debt crisis, on the other hand, did not begin with missed payments or a sudden market shock. It began quietly between 2018 and 2023 with the accumulation and partial concealment of large public liabilities, intensified by COVID-19 and rising global interest rates, and crystallised in 2024 and 2025 when audits uncovered massive under-reported debt and deficits, prompting the IMF to suspend its programme and investors to reassess Senegal's solvency.

Liquidity shock vs. solvency-transparency shock

Ghana suffered an acute liquidity and confidence crisis, stemming from a loss of market access and thinning reserves in 2022. A food and energy-induced high-inflation episode stemming from supply chain disruptions triggered rapid global monetary tightening, making dollar assets more attractive than cedi holdings. With palpable headwinds in the economy and high interest rates elsewhere in more stable economies, it was only a matter of time before investors pulled out. External debt service costs rose sharply, culminating in an unavoidable default on external debt.

Senegal's infrastructure-led growth strategy, financed primarily through Eurobonds, non-concessional financing, and state-owned enterprise debt backstopping, resulted in debt accumulation. The crisis emerged from ex post discovery of large "hidden debt". In effect, the shock is about credibility, reporting, and fiscal governance, not an immediate payment default. Senegal has not defaulted, nor missed Eurobond or official payments. It made a USD 471 million payment to its Eurobond holders in March 2026, dispelling short term default fears.

Debt composition and domestic financial stability risks

Ghana's debt crisis spelt doom for financial sector stability, given that domestic debt restructuring was a requirement for external debt restructuring. This is because a large share of tradable domestic bonds was held by banks, pension funds, and households. The financial system eventually absorbed the losses, with implications for the Ghanaian economy.

In Senegal, the national debt is deeply interlinked with WAEMU banks, making it regional in nature, with Senegalese banks among the largest sovereign debt holders in the CFA zone. A haircut in the mould of what Ghana experienced risks regional financial contagion, potentially destabilising the entire WAEMU banking system.

Box 1: Debt crises – Ghana vs. Senegal

Growth and revenue

Currency depreciation, structural inflation and liquidity squeeze had a toll on Ghana's GDP growth. In 2022 and 2023, the economy grew by 3.8 per cent and 3.1 per cent, respectively, from 5.1 per cent in 2021. Unlike in 2011 and 2012, Ghana did not have any new resource flows to support expenditure, and as a result, an economic turnaround relied almost entirely on austerity and debt relief.

Senegal's economy, on the other hand, grew robustly in 2024 and 2025, the debut and ramp-up years for hydrocarbon production, respectively, with the economy growing by 6.1 per cent in 2024 and 7.9 per cent in 2025. Petroleum revenue, though modest, gives Senegal a fighting chance.

Market access

Ghana was already locked out of markets when restructuring began, triggered by a rating downgrade, with the local bond market largely inaccessible. Ghana eventually saw its rating decline to a "selective default" rating.

Senegal, despite downgrades, still rolls over debt domestically and regionally and services Eurobonds, even though at rising cost. It scarcely has access to the Eurobond market.

While Ghana restructured because markets had already closed, Senegal risks closing them by restructuring too early, and putting an entire regional financial architecture into a state of confusion.

Currency regime

Currency weakness imposed significant costs on Ghana. The floating exchange rate regime and inadequate reserves to defend the currency made Ghana look vulnerable.

Senegal is a member of the WAEMU, which maintains a hard peg to the euro, which means the currency is quite stable, unlike in Ghana's case. This cushions it somewhat, with debt levels and servicing costs remaining stable, at least in terms of exchange rate variation. However, this monetary arrangement makes debt restructuring costlier than in standalone economies. The two monetary arrangements are not the same, so policy prescriptions ought to be idiosyncratic.

Conclusion

Ghana's restructuring was the consequence of an irreversible liquidity collapse.

However, Senegal's challenge is one of credibility, sequencing, and regional risk management. In effect, treating Senegal like Ghana risks:

- WAEMU financial contagion;
- Unnecessary market exclusion; and
- Premature destruction of a still viable growth debt adjustment path.



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
A PROMISING BUT FRAGILE OUTLOOK



Tepid growth

West Africa's growth is projected to moderate to 4.7 per cent in 2026, from 4.8 per cent in 2025, before rebounding to 4.9 per cent in 2027 (Figure 18, Annex 2). The growth in economic activity is expected to be adversely impacted by the ramifications of the war in the Middle East, with higher energy and fertiliser prices feeding into inflation at the country level. Fertiliser and energy supply disruptions will slow production due to limited availability and, at best, high input costs.

Figure 18: GDP growth: 2025-2027



Source: West African Development Outlook database

ECOWAS growth is projected to slow to 4.6 per cent in 2026 before reaching 4.9 per cent in 2027. For WAEMU, growth is projected to decelerate to 5.8 per cent in 2026 and bounce back to 6.0 per cent in 2027. WAMZ+ growth is expected to inch up marginally to 4.4 per cent in 2026 and further to 4.7 per cent in 2027. AES growth is projected to remain robust, growing at 5.8 per cent in 2026 and 2027, from 5.5 per cent in 2025.


At the country level, eight (8) Member States are projected to record growth declines, with growth stabilising in three (3) others in 2026 (Appendix Table 1).

Looming inflationary pressures

Sub-regional inflation is projected to continue on a declining trend, with ECOWAS and WAMZ+ average inflation mirroring it. In West Africa, average inflation is projected to decline to 11.1 per cent in 2026 and further to 10.2 per cent in 2027. This is on account of

more stable currencies, particularly in the WAMZ+, which will counteract energy and food price pressures from the war in the Middle East. Currency stability will be supported by strong commodity prices. Similarly, average inflation is projected to decline to 11.8 per cent in 2026 in ECOWAS from 16.8 per cent in 2025, declining further to 10.8 per cent in 2027. Average inflation in WAMZ+ is projected to ease from 21.1 per cent in 2025 to 13.5 per cent in 2026 and further to 12.5 per cent in 2027 (Figure 19, Annex 2).

Figure 19: Average inflation: 2025-2027



Source: West African Development Outlook database


Inflation in WAEMU and AES is projected to rise in 2026, driven by high fuel and other input prices. Average inflation in WAEMU is projected to increase markedly to 1.8 per cent in 2026 from 0.2 per cent in 2025, before declining to 1.7 per cent in 2027. In AES, average inflation will increase to 1.5 per cent and 1.6 per cent in 2026 and 2027, respectively.

In all, eight (8) Member States will experience higher inflation in 2026 compared with 2025, with most of them belonging to WAEMU.

A threat to fiscal consolidation

Lingering price pressures and an increasing need to deliver social services are projected to adversely affect fiscal balances through subsidies and higher procurement costs. In West Africa, the overall fiscal balance is projected to deteriorate to -3.5 per cent of GDP in 2026, from -2.6 per cent in 2025, before improving to -2.9 per cent in 2027 (Figure 20, Annex 3).

Figure 20: Fiscal balance: 2025-2027



Source: West African Development Outlook database

In ECOWAS, fiscal balance is projected to worsen to -3.6 per cent in 2026, from -2.2 per cent in 2025, before narrowing to -2.9 per cent in 2027. In 2026, WAEMU fiscal balance is expected to reach -3.8 per cent of GDP before improving to -3.3 per cent in 2027, with the WAMZ+ also experiencing a widening fiscal balance of -3.5 per cent in 2026. WAMZ+ fiscal balance is projected to improve to -2.8 per cent of GDP in 2027, while the AES's improves to -2.7 per cent in 2027, from -3.2 per cent in 2026.

Debt ratio improves

The sub-regional debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to stay on a declining path in 2026 and 2027. At the West Africa level, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to decline steadily from 49.3 per cent in 2025 to 45.9 per cent in 2026 and further to 45.0 per cent in 2027. ECOWAS follows a similar but more moderate trajectory, decreasing from 43.2 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 41.2 per cent in 2027. WAEMU debt is projected to decline gradually from 64.6 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 61.1 per cent in 2027. WAMZ+ debt is also projected to decline from 37.8 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 36.0 per cent in both 2026 and 2027. Finally, AES debt is also expected to exhibit a consistent reduction from 46.2 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 43.2 per cent in 2027 (Figure 21, Annex 3), closely tracking the overall sub-regional pattern.

Eight (8) Member States are projected to record growth declines, with growth stabilising in three (3) others in 2026. Also, eight (8) Member States will experience higher inflation in 2026 compared with 2025, with most of them belonging to WAEMU

Figure 21: Debt-to-GDP ratio: 2025-2027




Source: West African Development Outlook database

Almost all countries in the West African sub-region are projected to record lower debt ratios in 2026 than in 2025 (Appendix Table 2).

Current account surplus on the horizon

The current account balance is generally expected to be positive across all groupings. In West Africa, a surplus of 3.2 per cent of GDP is projected for 2026 before easing to 1.8 per cent in 2027. ECOWAS mirrors this trajectory with surpluses increasing from 2.0 per cent of GDP in 2025 to 3.4 per cent in 2026 before dropping to 1.8 per cent in 2027. WAEMU's current account balance is projected to widen modestly to -1.8 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to -1.9 per cent in 2027. The WAMZ+ current account balance is projected to strengthen to 5.6 per cent of GDP in 2026, from 3.8 per cent in 2025, before moderating to 3.7 per cent in 2027. In AES, the current account balance is projected to inch up to 0.9 per cent of GDP in 2026, before increasing significantly to 2.7 per cent in 2027 (Figure 22, Annex 4).

Figure 22: Current account balance: 2025-2027


Source: West African Development Outlook database

Three countries – Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Nigeria – are projected to record current account surpluses in 2026, while eight (8) countries are projected to record a deterioration in the ratio compared with 2025.

Almost all countries in the West African sub-region are projected to record lower debt ratios in 2026. Three countries – Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Nigeria – are projected to record current account surpluses in 2026, while eight (8) countries are projected to record a deterioration in the ratio compared with 2025.

Persistent unemployment

Unemployment is projected to worsen in the sub-region, with more people joining the labour force amid slow job creation. Six million people in West Africa are expected to be without jobs by the end of 2026, rising to 6.3 million in 2027. In ECOWAS, the number is projected to increase to 5.3 million and 5.6 million in 2026 and 2027, respectively, while WAEMU's unemployment stabilises at 1.4 million in 2027. WAMZ+ unemployment is projected to worsen to 4.6 million in 2026 and 4.9 million in 2027, while that of AES stabilises at 0.7 million in 2027 (Figure 23). Consistent with its population size, Nigeria alone accounts for over 60 per cent of unemployment in the sub-region (Annex 5).

Figure 23: Unemployment: 2025-2027

Source: EBID staff based on ILO Modelled Estimates (Accessed 26 May 2026).


Note: EBID staff calculated unemployment for groupings

Six million people in West Africa are expected to be without jobs by the end of 2026, rising to 6.3 million in 2027. Labour productivity is projected to improve across almost all groupings in the sub-region in 2026 and 2027.

A general increase in productivity

Labour productivity is projected to improve across almost all groupings in the sub-region in 2026 and 2027. The West African aggregate productivity is expected to reach 1.9 per cent in 2026 before declining marginally to 1.8 per cent in 2027. ECOWAS labour productivity will follow a similar trend, with WAMZ+ expected to grow by 1.8 per cent in 2026, slowing to 1.6 per cent in 2027. WAEMU productivity will decline to 2.3 per cent in 2026 before rebounding to 2.4 per cent in 2027, while AES will experience a growth of 1.9 per cent in 2026, declining to 1.8 per cent in 2027 (Figure 24).

Figure 24: Labour productivity growth: 2025-2027



Source: EBID staff based on ILO Modelled Estimates (Accessed 26 May 2026).

Note: EBID staff calculated productivity growth for groupings

UPSIDE POTENTIAL





Although the sub-region continues to face constraints such as high public debt, security challenges, and exposure to global shocks, several factors could drive sustained growth and development. These factors are interconnected and, if properly harnessed, can promote inclusive and resilient economic growth.

While events in the Middle East have led to downwardly revised macroeconomic projections, there are positive indicators that could support macro-fiscal outcomes, as outlined below.

Favourable commodity prices

Crude oil prices have increased astronomically since the war began, bringing windfall gains to major exporters in the sub-region, particularly Nigeria and Ghana. Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal will also benefit from increased resource rents, bringing fiscal relief and boosting gross external reserves. The price of gold, though not as bullish as in 2025, has not tumbled as feared. At this level, major gold exporters like Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali will reap gains, broadening their fiscal space and fortifying their gross external reserves if gold prices remain elevated. Bauxite prices have also appreciated markedly in 2026, primarily due to supply constraints. These supply constraints have arisen on account of bans on raw bauxite and site-specific production restrictions in producer countries. Guinea, which accounts for over half of global seaborne bauxite, stands to benefit greatly from these price levels to improve its fiscal space and boost its reserves position. Ghana and Sierra Leone also stand to gain from high bauxite prices.


Ramped-up production

Various investments are underway in West African countries in the hydrocarbon, gold, bauxite, and iron ore sectors. Increasing hydrocarbon production in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, as well as gold production in Ghana and Burkina Faso, has the potential to lift the growth in economic activity beyond expectations. In an era of elevated prices, increased production will help boost the reserves position and improve the fiscal balance, with concomitant effects for public debt.

An uptick in trade

The war in Iran has boosted intra-regional petroleum exports, with Nigeria supplying Ghana, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire with increased volumes of refined petroleum products, estimated at over 456,000 tonnes (equivalent to 12 cargoes). Nigeria has also ramped up fertiliser production since the war began and could provide partial relief to the sub-region if need be. In effect, the petroleum and fertiliser trade could support intra-regional trade, lowering import costs and boosting regional GDP.

DOWNSIDE RISKS





In the near term, the war in the Middle East could reverse the macroeconomic gains made in 2025 through inflationary pressures, interest rate hikes, and inadequate supply of agricultural inputs. Some of the risk factors are discussed below.

Fiscal slippages

Following the war in the Middle East and the attendant increases in energy and food prices, some governments have intervened to cushion the citizenry by introducing or increasing fuel subsidies and reversing energy-related taxes. This was not envisaged in national budgets but has come about out of necessity. There is a risk of lower realised revenues and higher expenditure, which could widen the fiscal deficit across many countries in the sub-region.

Food insecurity

The impact of the war on food prices was not immediately apparent in the first quarter of the year due to the timing and a bumper harvest in 2025 across the sub-region. While the food glut of 2025 has moderated the impact of the war on food prices, challenges with input supplies will persist as the war drags on, posing problems for the fourth quarter and 2027.

Furthermore, an unfavourable rainfall pattern will exacerbate food insecurity. The sporadic, sometimes excessive rainfall pattern in the first half of the year raises concerns about rainfall sufficiency for agriculture. These two factors, if they should occur, will suppress agricultural GDP and detract from the overall growth in economic activity.

Persistent inflation

High food and energy prices, mainly driven by the war in the Middle East, could erode the gains made in 2025 in inflation. Depending on the length of the war, logistical constraints threaten to push prices back to levels seen in 2022 and 2023. If the war does not end quickly, by June 2026 at the latest, prices will get out of hand and put inflationary pressures on countries in the sub-region. This will repress growth and cause many macroeconomic indicators to move in the wrong direction.

Exchange rate pressures

High petroleum prices have passed through to headline inflation in many jurisdictions, thereby increasing import bills. This has implications for the reserve position of countries whose exports may not yield commensurate resources. In the WAMZ, where countries operate floating or managed-floating exchange rate regimes, this could result in currency depreciation, which could, in turn, exert upward pressure on prices. Currency depreciation will worsen inflation, threaten fiscal consolidation and increase nominal debt.

Interest rate hikes

High inflation could reignite interest rate hikes in line with central banking practice to tame inflation. This will increase borrowing costs, which will translate into higher debt service, narrower fiscal space, and higher debt burdens. High interest rates will also suppress GDP growth and heighten credit risk.

Commodity price drop

The gains made in inflation and currency stability were largely supported by relatively high commodity prices, particularly gold and other metals. Gold producers like Ghana and Liberia reaped significant resource rents to support their domestic currencies, while Nigeria benefited from modest increases in crude oil prices. In the aftermath of the war in the Middle East, gold prices dropped to a low of USD3,177.25 per ounce in mid-May due to demand and logistical concerns. While the price of gold has rebounded, it has not returned to pre-war levels, let alone the peak of USD5,417.17 on January 28 (Figure 25).

Figure 25: Gold price trends



Source: Bloomberg (accessed on 15 May 2026)

Any abrupt drop in commodity prices will exert upward pressure on the exchange rate, which could, in turn, push prices higher.

Widespread power outages

The first five months of the year witnessed a litany of electricity supply shortfalls across many countries in the sub-region. From grid collapses in Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, gas supply challenges, localised infrastructure upgrades, and fire incidents in Ghana, to the impact of the aforementioned incidents on electricity supply in Benin, Niger, and Togo, power outages have become rife in 2026. This has affected businesses adversely. If this persists, it will have an adverse impact on the growth in economic activity in 2026, with potential ramifications for inflation through constrained production. National grid fragilities, infrastructure maintenance backlogs, inadequate transmission and distribution networks, and sector-specific debt threaten to derail the possibility of a reliable electricity supply in the sub-region.



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A DISTANT WAR, FAMILIAR SHOCKS



WAR


The ongoing conflict in the Middle East has emerged as a significant global economic shock. While geographically distant, West African economies are deeply interconnected with the global system through trade, finance, energy markets, and security linkages. As a result, the effects of such a conflict are transmitted across regions through multiple channels.

Energy supply challenges and price uptick

The Strait of Hormuz is a critical transit route for the oil trade, with about 25 per cent of global oil and gas supplies going through it. The war has raised supply concerns, with Brent crude oil price topping US\$118 per barrel in the aftermath of the first strike before declining to circa US\$109 by mid-May (Box 2). The blockade by both Iran and the United States has increased supply uncertainty and kept the price of crude oil and natural gas high for an appreciable length of time. This has led to high ex-pump prices in West Africa, with many governments springing to action to provide subsidies and/or remove fuel taxes and levies to ease the pain on end-users.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO, 2026) posits that crude oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz declined by 95 per cent in the aftermath of the war. A comparative analysis of the 7-day moving average of oil shipments in 2025 and that of 2026 (Figure 26) attests to this assertion.

Figure 26: Daily crude oil outbound shipments through the Strait of Hormuz



Source: World Trade Organisation (Sourced: 26 April 2026)


The resultant impacts of the ensuing energy price increases in most West African countries include a higher import bill, increasing transportation and electricity tariffs, heightened inflationary pressures, a

narrower fiscal space, elevated pressures on external reserves, and attendant currency depreciation risks. For net oil exporters, the downside risks will be counterbalanced by windfall crude oil receipts and an improved fiscal position.

Food security concerns

Around a quarter to a third of global sea-borne fertiliser supplies pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This makes the chokepoint a critical player in global food security discussions. With the blockade in the Strait, supply concerns have escalated, underlined by the significant drop in fertiliser shipments through it since the war began. According to the WTO (2026), fertiliser-related shipments through the Strait of Hormuz have dropped by approximately 87 per cent since the war started, as indicated by the gap between the 7-day moving average between 2026 and that of the prior year (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Daily volume of fertiliser-related outbound shipments through the Strait of Hormuz



Source: World Trade Organisation (Sourced: 26 April 2026)

While African countries, and for that matter, West African countries, are not significant importers of fertiliser from the Middle East (estimated at less than 20%), their dependence on fertiliser and fertiliser input imports makes the continent vulnerable to global price trends. This is because, given that about 30 per cent of supplies are stranded, the rest of the world will compete for the remainder, leading to price increases. This explains why fertiliser prices have increased by 40-80 per cent since the war began.

Excluding Nigeria, which is fairly self-sufficient in fertiliser production, the rest of West Africa imports about 90 per cent of its fertiliser, making it even more vulnerable to supply concerns and price hikes. This increases food insecurity risks, particularly for the 2026/2027 crop season, given that latter-year harvests help cushion future-year food supplies and



prices. Again, given that Asia is feeling the high cost of fertilisers, this will be reflected in the prices of rice and wheat, West African staples that are primarily imported from that region. This could impose hardships on the already poor populations in the sub-region. Again, it poses fiscal risks, with heightened pressure on governments to subsidise fertiliser prices to improve food prices.

Financial tightening and currency weakening

The war has increased uncertainty in the global financial architecture, prompting investors to shift capital to safe-haven assets, particularly the US dollar. West African countries will ultimately lose out in the process. The evidence is that the dollar index has rebounded by 1.5 per cent since the war, as of May 26, 2026, leading most floating currencies to depreciate against an intrinsically strong dollar.

For example, according to Bloomberg numbers as of May 26, 2026, the Ghanaian cedi had depreciated against the US dollar by circa 8.3 per cent, with the CFA losing value against the US dollar by 1.5 per cent since February 27, 2026. The Nigerian naira, on the other hand, has depreciated by a marginal 0.8 per cent against the US dollar (Figure 28).

While geographically distant, West African economies are deeply interconnected with the global system through trade, finance, energy markets, and security linkages. As a result, the effects of such a conflict are transmitted across regions through multiple channels.

Figure 28: Currency performance since the war in the Middle East


USD-Naira



USD-FCFA



USD-Ghana Cedi



Source: Bloomberg

Possible macroeconomic impacts

High energy and food prices invoke hardships. Governments would want to relieve citizens of such a burden as far as their national budgets can carry them. High prices will translate into higher inflation, which will repress the growth in economic activity. Fuel and fertiliser subsidies will trigger widening fiscal deficits, with attendant increased borrowing, which will translate into high debt burdens. The high import bill will put significant pressure on international reserves and on freely floating currencies in the sub-region, increasing external debt service costs and further driving up inflation. In effect, the war could upend macroeconomic gains that were made in 2025, which was one of the best individual and sub-regional performances in normal times in a long while.

Box 2: Timeline and Impacts of the War in the Middle East

Introduction

The war in the Middle East has introduced a new level of uncertainty in the global economic and geopolitical architecture, with serious supply chain and inflationary concerns for many countries. Below is a timeline of the events leading to the war, the current state of the war and its implications for energy prices.

Pre-war events

June 2025: Israel launched large scale strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities (Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan), ending a period of shadow conflict and setting the stage for open confrontation.

Late 2025 to early 2026: Nuclear talks collapsed. Iran expanded missile deployments and maritime harassment near the Strait of Hormuz, while Israel and the US elevated military readiness.

Open war begins

28 February 2026: The United States and Israel launched a coordinated air and missile campaign, dubbed *Operation Epic Fury*, against Iranian leadership, nuclear, missile, and air defence targets. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, along with several government officials, was killed in the opening strikes. Iran immediately declared the attacks an act of war.

Regional expansion and maritime crisis

1-7 March 2026: Iran retaliated with ballistic missiles and drones against Israel, U.S. bases, and energy infrastructure in Gulf states. Tehran effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, attacking or deterring commercial shipping. Maritime insurance rates spiked, and many tankers were stranded.

Mid March 2026: The US Navy imposed a de facto blockade of Iranian ports; Israel struck Hezbollah targets in Lebanon. Casualties mounted across Iran, Israel, and Lebanon as the conflict widened to multiple fronts.

Ceasefire

7-8 April 2026: After Pakistan mediated talks, the U.S., Israel, and Iran agreed to a temporary ceasefire. Iran announced a conditional reopening of Hormuz, retaining control measures over transit.

Mid April to early May 2026: Despite the ceasefire, naval standoffs continued. The U.S. launched Project Freedom to escort neutral shipping, which Iran labelled a violation of the truce. Missile and drone incidents persisted around Gulf energy hubs, keeping the conflict formally “paused” but unresolved.

4 May 2026: The US launched what it called *Operation Project Freedom*, hoping to use it to force the Strait open. The operation also blocked all commercial shipping operations to and from Iranian ports.

28 May 2026: The US reportedly hit several drones and a ground control station around the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran reportedly launched drone and missile strikes at Kuwait.

29 May 2026: There were talks of a negotiated deal between the US and Iran for a 60-day ceasefire, pending Mr Trump’s approval.

Early June 2026: Renewed and sporadic hostilities emerged with the US and Israel striking inside Iran and Iran striking US allies in the Middle East, Israel, and downing a military helicopter.



Box 2: Timeline and Impacts of the War in the Middle East

June 14 and 15: US and Iran announced a broader “understanding” to end the war.

Petroleum Price Impacts

1-2 March 2026 (first trading days after outbreak): Brent crude jumped from circa USD72 per barrel to above USD90 per barrel as markets priced in Hormuz disruption. This marked the largest daily oil gain since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine (Figure 2.1).

March 2026: With up to 20 million barrels per day of oil and LNG disrupted at Hormuz, Brent surged nearly 51 per cent in one month, briefly touching USD120 per barrel – one of the biggest monthly rises on record – and settling at USD115 per barrel.

Figure 2.1: Brent crude oil price



Source: Bloomberg (Accessed on 06 May 2026)

Late March: Gulf producers curtailed output due to storage constraints and security risks, amplifying the supply shock and feeding global inflation expectations.

Early to mid-April 2026: News of the ceasefire triggered sharp but short lived pullbacks. Brent fell from circa USD120 to the USD105-110 per barrel range, still far above pre war levels due to uncertainty over transit safety and insurance costs.

Late April to early May 2026: Missile and drone attacks near UAE oil hubs and continued naval confrontations pushed Brent back above USD115 per barrel, with intraday spikes over USD125 per barrel whenever ceasefire breaches were reported.

Retail impact: U.S. gasoline prices climbed above USD4.30-4.40 per gallon, while Asian importers faced fuel shortages and rolling price controls.

June 15: Brent crude oil price dropped to its lowest in three months to USD82.9 per barrel early in the morning, as news of an agreement between the US and Iran became clearer. US crude also dropped by about 5.5 per cent to USD80.29 per barrel.

BUILDING RESILIENCE





The war in the Middle East, just as the Russia-Ukraine war, has exposed how vulnerable the West African sub-region is to other regions for basic needs. The sub-region relies on grain and refined fuel imports, which are major pressure points whenever there is an external shock. The war constitutes a major external shock for West African economies, transmitted primarily through energy prices, trade disruptions, inflation, and financial conditions. The sub-region's structural vulnerabilities, particularly dependence on fuel imports and limited fiscal space, magnify these effects. While significant progress has been made through increased refining capacity and fertiliser production in Nigeria, a lot remains to be done to make the sub-region food and energy self-sufficient, insulating the citizenry from the full impact of this war and future shocks.

The war constitutes a major external shock for West African economies, transmitted primarily through energy prices, trade disruptions, inflation, and financial conditions.

Building refining capacities

Apart from short-term interventions that aim to cushion against the high cost of living, there is a need to invest in refining capacity, which will complement the already existing capacities in the sub-region. Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal are significant crude oil producers, which import substantial quantities of refined petroleum products at high prices. Apart from supply risk, the citizenry is made to bear the transportation, freight and insurance charges, which could have been averted if these countries had healthy refining capacities.

Expanding fertiliser production

There is a need to intentionally increase fertiliser production in the sub-region, particularly in countries that can do so competitively. This will circumvent supply bottlenecks, which have become a recurring phenomenon over the past six years, and ensure food sovereignty in the sub-region. As a significant gas producer, Nigeria should take the lead by cementing its place as a fertiliser self-sufficient economy and look beyond to supply other countries, while other countries that have the capacity to produce fertiliser follow suit.

Encouraging intra-regional trade

The events of the past six years have highlighted the importance of sourcing goods from neighbouring countries. Fuel and fertiliser are two critical commodities that affect the daily lives and livelihoods of the people in the sub-region. It is important to, beyond increasing production capacities, facilitate cross-border trade in these commodities across the sub-region by eliminating barriers and harmonising port and land border regulations that inhibit trade. Increased trade in the sub-region will eventually translate into improved prices for the citizenry and shared prosperity for all.

Building fiscal and external reserve buffers

The year 2025 was a good year for many countries in the sub-region, due to high commodity prices. In times like these, it is important to build fiscal and external reserve buffers to cope with unanticipated shocks. Thin fiscal margins limit the state's capacity to intervene meaningfully to alleviate the suffering of the masses without compromising fiscal discipline. If the war persists, many countries that have offered subsidies or removed fuel taxes will experience widening fiscal deficits or be forced to abandon such interventions.

Currencies in the sub-region were largely stable in 2025. This was due to a confluence of factors, including a weaker dollar and windfall commodity export receipts. Faced with a higher import bill, most countries with freely floating currencies will run out of reserves, returning them to a path of currency depreciation and its attendant impact on inflation. It is important to build reserve buffers in the medium- to long-term to sustain currency strength.

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
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COUNTRY BRIEFS



BENIN



Macroeconomic Performance

Economic activity in Benin remained strong in 2025, building on the exceptional performance of 2024 when growth reached 7.5 per cent. Real GDP growth in 2025 stabilised at 7.5 per cent, driven by agriculture, agro-processing, construction, and services, including trade, transport, and tourism. Industrial activity benefited from increased capacity utilisation at Glo-Djigbé Industrial Zone (GDIZ), while port activity recovered sharply following earlier trade disruptions with neighbouring countries. Average inflation declined to 1.1 per cent in 2025, from 1.2 per cent in 2024, reflecting favourable agricultural output and the normalisation of fuel prices. Fiscal balance narrowed from -3.1 per cent of GDP in 2024 to -2.9 per cent in 2025, underpinned by strong domestic revenue mobilisation and expenditure management. Public debt declined to 57.3 per cent of GDP in 2025, down from 60.5 per cent in 2024, supported by strong nominal GDP growth and a modest primary deficit. The current account balance remained in deficit, even though it narrowed to -5.7 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -6.0 per cent in 2024, as exports of processed agricultural products and port services increased.


Outlook

Real GDP growth is projected to remain strong at 7.1 per cent in 2026 and 6.5 per cent in 2027, supported by continued investment in infrastructure, agro-

industry (including an expansion of GDIZ), and services. Average inflation is projected to remain moderate, though it will increase marginally to 1.7 per cent in 2026 before declining to 1.5 per cent in 2027, barring major supply shocks, particularly from the war in the Middle East. The current account balance is projected to continue to decline to -5.2 per cent of GDP in 2026 and -5.1 per cent in 2027, respectively, as export capacity expands and import substitution increases through local processing. Fiscal balance is expected to remain close to the WAEMU threshold of -3.0 per cent of GDP through 2027. It is projected to increase marginally to -3.1 per cent of GDP in 2026 before declining to -2.9 per cent in 2027, while public debt is projected to decline consistently to 56.9 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 55.1 per cent in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

Downside risks to the outlook stem from regional insecurity, climate-related shocks affecting agriculture, and renewed trade disruptions with neighbouring countries. Global financial tightening could also raise borrowing costs, while the war in the Middle East threatens macroeconomic stability, as did the war in Ukraine. Addressing these risks will require strengthened security spending efficiency, climate adaptation investments, and further diversification of the economic base.





BURKINA FASO



Macroeconomic Performance

Burkina Faso recorded sustained growth in 2025, with GDP growth inching up to 5.0 per cent, from 4.8 per cent in 2024, supported by a broad-based expansion in services, resilient agricultural output benefiting from favourable rainfall and government support programs, and a rebound in mining activity amid higher gold prices. Inflation declined sharply, with average consumer prices tumbling to -0.5 per cent, reflecting easing food prices and improved supply conditions within the WAEMU monetary framework. Fiscal performance improved under the IMF-supported program, with the overall fiscal balance narrowing sharply to -3.5 per cent of GDP, driven by stronger domestic revenue mobilisation, particularly from the mining sector, and expenditure restraint. Public debt continued to decline to 52.0 per cent of GDP, down from 57.2 per cent in 2024, mainly on the back of strong nominal GDP growth. The external position strengthened markedly, as higher export receipts (predominantly gold) and improved terms of trade shifted the current account from a deficit to a surplus of 6.7 per cent of GDP in 2025.


Outlook

GDP growth projections indicate continued, though slightly moderating, growth, with economic activity projected to grow at 5.0 per cent in 2026 before inching up marginally to 5.1 per cent in 2027. This reflects normalisation in agricultural output after strong

harvests, sustained services activity, and steady mining production. Inflation is expected to remain subdued within the WAEMU convergence range, even though average inflation is projected to swing to 1.9 per cent in 2026 and 2027, from -0.5 per cent in 2025. Escalating prices will have an adverse impact on fiscal balance, worsening slightly to -3.6 per cent of GDP in 2026 before narrowing to 3.0 per cent in 2027. Public debt is expected to decline to 49.0 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 47.6 per cent in 2027. The external sector is expected to remain strong, with the current account balance remaining in surplus (i.e. 9.1% of GDP in 2026 and 2027), driven by favourable terms of trade and robust gold export receipts.

Probable Headwinds

A worsening of the already fragile security situation will seriously disrupt economic activity, deter investment, and constrain agricultural and mining production. Furthermore, the economy remains highly exposed to climate shocks, including droughts and floods, which threaten food production and exacerbate already severe food. The country's heavy dependence on a narrow export base (particularly gold and cotton) makes it sensitive to terms-of-trade fluctuations and global commodity price volatility. These risks are compounded by limited fiscal space and rising public spending pressures, especially security-related expenditures, which could hinder ongoing fiscal consolidation and elevate debt risks if shocks materialise.



CABO VERDE



Macroeconomic Performance

Cabo Verde's real GDP growth slowed to 5.5 per cent in 2025, compared with 7.2 per cent in 2024, helped by sustained expansion in tourism, construction, and related services, rising remittances, and increased private consumption. Inflation remained modest and well anchored, even though average inflation rose to 2.3 per cent in 2025, up from 1.1 per cent in 2024. Fiscal performance improved significantly, with the overall fiscal balance shifting to a surplus of 1.1 per cent of GDP, compared to -1.1 per cent in 2024. This was driven by strong tax revenue mobilisation, one-off concession receipts (linked to the privatisation/management agreement for the country's airports), and disciplined expenditure management. Public debt continued its downward trajectory but remained elevated, declining to roughly 101.0 per cent of GDP, reflecting sustained fiscal consolidation and strong nominal growth. The current account remained in surplus at 3.6 per cent of GDP, supported by buoyant tourism receipts, remittances, and improved export performance.


Outlook

Real GDP growth in Cabo Verde is projected to moderate to 4.8 per cent in 2026 before rebounding to 5.1 per cent in 2027, supported by sustained tourism inflows, public investment, and remittance-backed consumption. Inflation is expected to remain low and stable, averaging 2.1 per cent and 1.9 per

cent in 2026 and 2027, respectively. Fiscal balance is expected to remain moderate, even though it will exit surplus territory to -0.9 per cent of GDP in 2026 before improving to near zero in 2027, as stronger revenues and expenditure control offset declining one-off gains. Public debt is projected to continue its downward trajectory, declining to around 96.2 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 91.5 per cent in 2027, supported by primary surpluses and robust nominal growth. The current account balance is projected to move from a surplus to a deficit of 0.4 per cent of GDP as import demand linked to investment and energy needs increases, partially offset by strong tourism receipts and remittances.

Probable Headwinds

The country's high dependence on tourism leaves it vulnerable to external demand shocks, geopolitical tensions, and fluctuations in income and travel patterns in key European source markets. Moreover, the country faces persistent external vulnerabilities, including exposure to global energy and food prices and tightening international financial conditions, which could widen external imbalances and put pressure on reserves. Climate-related risks remain significant, with increasing frequency of droughts and extreme weather events threatening water resources, infrastructure, and the sustainability of tourism and agriculture.





CÔTE D'IVOIRE



Macroeconomic Performance

Economic activity in Côte d'Ivoire remained robust, with real GDP growing at 6.5 per cent, up from 6.0 per cent in 2024, helped by services (especially trade and digital activities), industrial growth supported by construction and new hydrocarbon production, and resilient agricultural output, notably cocoa. Average inflation declined sharply to about 0.1 per cent, from 3.4 per cent in 2024, benefiting from easing food prices and prudent monetary conditions within the WAEMU framework. Fiscal consolidation advanced significantly, with the overall fiscal deficit narrowing to 3.0 per cent of GDP, supported by enhanced revenue mobilisation and improved expenditure controls. Public debt declined moderately to 56.3 per cent of GDP, reflecting continued fiscal discipline and steady growth. The current account deficit narrowed significantly to 1.1 per cent of GDP, driven by improved terms of trade, particularly higher cocoa prices, and increased oil exports, alongside contained import growth.


Outlook

The Ivorian economy is projected to slow to a growth of 6.3 per cent in 2026 and 2027. This robust growth will be supported by sustained private consumption and investment, expanding hydrocarbons production,

and ongoing infrastructure development. Inflation is expected to remain moderate, even though it will increase to 1.9 per cent in 2026 and decline marginally to 1.7 per cent in 2027, supported by improved food supply conditions and prudent monetary policy. Fiscal policy is set to remain anchored on consolidation, with the overall fiscal deficit increasing marginally to -3.1 per cent of GDP in 2026 and returning to -3.0 per cent in 2027. Public debt is projected to remain moderate and on a declining path, falling to 54.8 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 53.3 per cent in 2027, reflecting sustained growth and improved fiscal balances. The current account balance is projected to stabilise at -1.1 per cent of GDP in 2026, supported by rising oil output, favourable commodity prices, and export diversification.

Probable Headwinds

Exposure to commodity price volatility, particularly cocoa and, increasingly, oil, is a key risk factor for the Ivorian economy. Furthermore, adverse weather events will impact cocoa, cashew and crop production. External risks, including tighter global financial conditions, geopolitical tensions affecting energy prices, and potential spillovers from regional insecurity in the Sahel, pose threats to investment, trade, and macroeconomic stability.



THE GAMBIA



Macroeconomic Performance

The Gambia's economy grew by 6.0 per cent in 2025, up from 5.6 per cent in 2024, supported by expansion across agriculture, construction, and, especially, services, with tourism, remittances, and private consumption as key demand-side drivers. Average inflation declined markedly to 7.9 per cent, down from 11.6 per cent in 2024, due to falling food prices and tighter monetary conditions. Fiscal performance also improved to -2.9 per cent of GDP from -4.0 per cent, reflecting stronger revenue mobilisation and expenditure controls. Public debt remained elevated but on a declining trajectory, with the debt-to-GDP ratio falling to 73.9 per cent, supported by fiscal consolidation and stronger nominal growth. The current account deficit narrowed markedly to -5.0 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -6.5 per cent in 2024 due to robust tourism receipts, rising remittances, and moderated import demand.


Outlook

Real GDP growth is projected to contract to 5.2 per cent in 2026 and 5.4 per cent in 2027, on the back of sustained expansion in tourism, agriculture, and remittance-induced consumption, though tempered by fiscal consolidation and external headwinds. Inflation is expected to ease further within the single-digit range to 5.5 per cent in 2026 and further to 5.2 per cent in 2027, aided by tighter monetary policy and declining food price pressures. Overall fiscal

deficit is projected to narrow to -1.5 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to -0.4 per cent in 2027, supported by improved revenue mobilisation and expenditure containment. Public debt is expected to decline to below 70 per cent of GDP for the first time in a long while. It is expected to ease to 66.9 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 60.8 per cent in 2027. The current account balance, on the other hand, is expected to deteriorate to -5.3 per cent of GDP in 2026 before improving to -4.7 per cent in 2027. The widening of the deficit is mainly driven by import needs and investment demand, with strong tourism receipts and remittance inflows moderating the impact in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

A key concern is the country's elevated public debt burden, which continues to absorb a large share of fiscal resources, limiting space for development spending and increasing vulnerability to shocks. The economy's dependence on tourism, remittances, and imports makes it susceptible to external shocks. A slowdown in key partner economies or global disruptions could weaken external balances and growth. Persistent current account deficits and foreign exchange pressures further underscore external fragility, particularly amid rising import demand and limited export diversification. In addition, the country faces climate-related risks, including erratic rainfall, flooding, and coastal erosion, which threaten agricultural output, infrastructure, and livelihoods in a largely climate-sensitive economy.





GHANA



Macroeconomic Performance

Ghana's economy accelerated to 6.0 per cent growth, driven by robust expansion in services, a rebound in agriculture, and solid private consumption and investment, alongside strong gold export performance. Inflation declined sharply from elevated levels in 2024 to an average of 14.2 per cent, reflecting tight monetary policy, improved food supply, exchange rate appreciation, and stabilising macroeconomic conditions. Fiscal consolidation was significant, with the overall fiscal balance narrowing to around -1.3 per cent of GDP, on the back of stronger revenue mobilisation, expenditure restraint, and reforms under the IMF-supported programme. Public debt declined markedly following restructuring efforts and improved fiscal outcomes, falling to 48.8 per cent of GDP. Ghana recorded a current account surplus of about 7.9 per cent of GDP, driven by high gold exports, improved remittances, and reserve accumulation.


Outlook

Ghana's macroeconomic outlook for 2026–2027 suggests continued stabilisation with moderate growth, low inflation, and improving fiscal and debt dynamics, although risks remain. Real GDP growth

is projected to moderate to 5.1 per cent in 2026 and 5.3 per cent in 2027, supported by ongoing recovery in services and agriculture, sustained investment, and strong commodity exports. Average inflation is expected to decline sharply to 4.3 per cent and 4.1 per cent, respectively, in 2026 and 2027, reflecting continued monetary discipline and exchange rate stability. The fiscal balance is projected to increase moderately to -2.1 per cent of GDP in 2026 before easing to -1.8 per cent in 2027. Public debt is projected to continue declining gradually to 48.1 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 45.7 per cent in 2027, reflecting debt restructuring gains and prudent fiscal policy. The current account balance is projected to remain positive, reaching 10.7 per cent of GDP in 2026 and declining to 10.0 per cent in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

Ghana faces commodity price fluctuations, particularly for gold, oil, and cocoa, which underpin export earnings and fiscal revenues. The country also remains sensitive to global shocks, including rising energy prices and geopolitical tensions, which can increase import costs, reignite inflationary pressures, and strain external balances given Ghana's reliance on imported fuel.



GUINEA



Macroeconomic Performance

In 2025, Guinea's economy recorded an impressive 6.7 per cent growth in economic activity, helped by robust bauxite production and increased investment. Inflation moderated to 3.1 per cent, down from 4.5 per cent in 2024, with exchange rate stability, easing supply shocks and tighter monetary conditions providing support. However, fiscal pressures intensified, with the overall fiscal balance increasing to -7.0 per cent of GDP, up from -5.0 per cent in 2024, reflecting higher infrastructure spending, energy subsidies, and limited domestic revenue mobilisation. Public debt, which has remained below 50 per cent of GDP for an appreciable length of time, eased to 48.1 per cent of GDP, as borrowing supported investment linked to large-scale mining projects. However, the current account balance deteriorated markedly to -22.3 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -14.7 per cent in 2024, largely due to heavy imports of capital goods associated with the Simandou iron ore project.


Outlook

Real GDP growth is projected to accelerate sharply to around 8.7 per cent in 2026 and rise further to 9.1 per cent in 2027, underpinned by the ramp-up of large-scale mining projects, especially the Simandou iron ore development, and sustained investment in extractive infrastructure. Inflation is forecast to remain relatively contained, even though rising to 4.3 per cent in 2026 and declining marginally to 4.1 per cent in 2027, supported by exchange rate stability and

easing domestic supply constraints. Fiscal balance is projected to narrow to -5.0 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to -4.2 per cent in 2027, consistent with continued infrastructure spending, challenges in revenue mobilisation, and the need to support the mining-led expansion. Public debt is projected to remain moderate, declining to 44.1 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 40.5 per cent, in line with strong nominal GDP growth and a narrowing fiscal balance. The current account balance is projected to narrow to -3.6 per cent of GDP in 2026, breaching the surplus line and ending 2027 at 0.1 per cent.

Probable Headwinds

A heavy dependence on the extractive sector, particularly bauxite and emerging iron ore production, makes growth highly sensitive to global commodity price fluctuations and limits the transmission of economic gains to employment and poverty reduction. Weak linkages between mining and the broader economy constrain diversification and inclusive growth. At the same time, the scale-up of large infrastructure projects tied to mining is likely to sustain sizeable fiscal deficits and rising borrowing needs, posing risks to fiscal sustainability if revenues from the sector are not effectively mobilised and managed. The country also remains exposed to external imbalances, as high import demand for capital goods continues to widen the current account deficit, leaving Guinea vulnerable to financing shocks and shifts in foreign investment flows.





GUINEA-BISSAU



Macroeconomic Performance

Guinea-Bissau's real GDP growth in 2025 increased moderately to 5.5 per cent, up from 4.8 per cent in 2024, driven by stronger cashew output and exports, which boosted private consumption and activity in services. Average inflation declined sharply to 0.9 per cent, from 3.7 per cent in 2024, reflecting lower international fuel prices, easing domestic price pressures, and favourable base effects. Fiscal balance eased to -6.7 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -7.3 per cent in 2024, supported by higher cashew-related revenues but constrained by weak tax mobilisation and expenditure pressures. Public debt remained elevated, though on a declining path, at approximately 75.3 per cent of GDP, reflecting ongoing efforts to restore debt sustainability. The current account deficit narrowed to -6.2 per cent of GDP, benefiting from improved cashew export volumes and prices.


Outlook

The country's real GDP growth is projected to soften to 4.8 per cent in 2026, reflecting headwinds from weaker external demand for cashew exports, geopolitical pressures affecting global prices, and domestic political uncertainty, although agriculture and services are expected to remain key drivers. Inflation is projected to increase to an average of 1.9 per cent in 2026, before easing to 1.7 per cent in

2027. Fiscal consolidation is expected to continue, with the overall fiscal balance narrowing to -4.0 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to -3.5 per cent in 2027, contingent on improved revenue mobilisation and spending restraint under ongoing reform programmes. Public debt is projected to decline further but remain elevated, falling marginally to 73.5 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 71.7 per cent in 2027, with the current account balance inching up marginally to -6.7 per cent of GDP in 2026 before declining to -5.4 per cent in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

Fluctuations in international cashew prices or demand could sharply affect growth, revenues, and the external balance. The economy is also exposed to external shocks, including rising global food and energy prices and geopolitical tensions, which can increase import costs, pressure inflation, and weaken the current account position. Persistent political instability poses a major risk by disrupting donor support, weakening investor confidence, and complicating policy implementation. Moreover, the high public debt levels and limited fiscal space constrain the government's ability to respond to shocks and sustain essential public investment, especially given weak domestic revenue mobilisation. Finally, unfavourable rainfall patterns will adversely affect agricultural growth, including cashews.



LIBERIA



Macroeconomic Performance

Liberia's economy grew by 5.1 per cent, driven largely by a rebound in mining, particularly iron ore and gold, alongside moderate expansion in agriculture and services, with private consumption and mineral exports supporting demand. Inflation inched up marginally to an average of 8.3 per cent, reflecting earlier currency depreciation, supply constraints, and global price pressures, although tightening policies helped stabilise prices toward the end of the year. Fiscal performance improved under consolidation efforts, with the overall fiscal balance narrowing to -1.4 per cent of GDP and the primary balance turning into a modest surplus due to stronger domestic revenue mobilisation and expenditure restraint. Public debt declined to 54.9 per cent of GDP, on the back of a strong economic growth and a narrowing fiscal deficit. The current account balance continued to ease to -6.1 per cent of GDP, supported primarily by mineral exports.


Outlook

The country's real GDP growth is projected to stabilise at 5.1 per cent in 2026 before increasing modestly to 5.5 per cent in 2027, supported by sustained expansion in iron ore and gold mining, alongside a recovery in agriculture and modest gains in services and manufacturing. Inflation is expected to decline to 5.6 per cent, on average, in 2026 and further to 5.1 per cent in 2027, supported by prudent monetary

policy and improved exchange rate stability. Fiscal balance is projected to worsen marginally to -1.6 per cent of GDP in 2026 on account of higher fuel prices, necessitating targeted subsidies for the National Transit Authority buses and critical hospitals. This is projected to ease to -1.1 per cent of GDP in 2027, assuming an early end of the war in the Middle East. Public debt is projected to remain broadly stable and on a sustainable trajectory, declining to 54.0 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 53.8 per cent in 2027, contingent on continued fiscal prudence and concessional financing. However, the current account balance is projected to worsen to 12.7 per cent of GDP in 2026, easing to 12.4 per cent in 2027, on the back of a high import bill amid rising global prices.

Probable Headwinds

Liberia's heavy dependence on the mining sector exposes growth, fiscal revenues, and export earnings to fluctuations in global commodity prices. At the same time, persistently large current account deficits and high import dependence, particularly for fuel, food, and capital goods, leave the economy vulnerable to external shocks and foreign exchange pressures, especially amid volatile global prices. Moreover, inflationary pressures could re-emerge due to exchange rate depreciation, supply-side constraints, or global commodity price shocks, eroding household purchasing power and macroeconomic stability.





MALI



Macroeconomic Performance

Mali's economy slowed to a growth of 4.9 per cent in 2025, from 5.0 per cent in 2024, constrained by disruptions to fuel supply chains, reduced gold production, and persistent insecurity, even though strong agricultural output and services expansion supported growth. Average inflation declined to 2.3 per cent, reflecting subdued demand conditions, regional monetary stability within the WAEMU framework, and easing food price pressures. The fiscal balance narrowed to -1.6 per cent of GDP, on the back of a healthy revenue growth relative to expenditure. Public debt moderated to 41.9 per cent of GDP in 2025, on the back of a growing economy and an improving fiscal balance. Mali's current account balance improved markedly to -0.8 per cent of GDP in 2025, on the back of exports from gold, cotton, and new lithium shipments.


Outlook

Mali's real GDP growth is projected to rebound to around 5.7 per cent in 2026, stabilising in 2027, supported by a recovery in gold mining, continued expansion in agriculture, and the scaling up of lithium extraction, although constrained by insecurity and policy uncertainty. Inflation is expected to remain contained at 1.8 per cent in 2026 and 1.6 per cent in 2027, reflecting the stabilising influence of the WAEMU monetary framework, relatively subdued

demand pressures, and improved agricultural output. The fiscal balance is projected to widen to -2.4 per cent of GDP in 2026 before improving marginally to -2.3 per cent in 2027. Public debt is projected to remain broadly stable, gradually declining to 40.8 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 39.5 per cent in 2027, mainly on the back of growth recovery. The current account balance is projected to worsen to -1.6 per cent of GDP in 2026 and improve to 1.7 per cent in 2027, mainly due to the impact of high fuel prices in 2026.

Probable Headwinds

Persistent insecurity and conflict, particularly in the northern and central regions, which continue to disrupt transport corridors, raise logistics costs, deter private investment, and weaken overall economic activity. Political and policy uncertainty, including governance challenges, shifting regulatory frameworks and strained relations with regional and international partners, could undermine investor confidence and delay investment decisions. Mali also remains highly vulnerable to climate shocks, such as floods and erratic rainfall, which threaten agricultural output, food security, and rural livelihoods in a predominantly rain-fed economy. Finally, declining foreign aid and tightening external financing conditions pose significant risks, as the country relies heavily on concessional financing to support fiscal operations and development spending.



NIGER



Macroeconomic Performance

Niger's real GDP growth decelerated to 6.9 per cent in 2025, from 10.3 per cent in 2024, despite increased crude oil production and exports, complemented by resilient agricultural activity. Inflation declined significantly to an average of about -4.6 per cent, down from 9.1 per cent in 2024, reflecting improved food supply conditions and easing price pressures following earlier shocks. Fiscal balance narrowed to -3.3 per cent of GDP in 2025, supported by higher oil-related revenues, cautious expenditure management, and the gradual normalisation of economic activity after sanctions. Public debt improved to 45.4 per cent of GDP in 2025, reflecting both improved revenue performance and disciplined borrowing. The current account deficit narrowed to about 5.0 per cent of GDP, driven by rising oil exports that offset high import needs related to investment and consumption.


Outlook

Real GDP growth is projected to stabilise at 6.9 per cent in 2026, before declining to 6.7 per cent in 2027, driven largely by expanding oil production and continued support from agriculture and services. Average inflation is expected to remain very low at 0.7

per cent in 2026, before rising marginally to 1.1 per cent, reflecting favourable agricultural output and the anchoring effect of the WAEMU monetary framework. Fiscal balance is projected to widen to -3.7 per cent of GDP in 2026, before declining to -3.0 per cent in 2027, as authorities face reduced external financing, security-related spending pressures, and the need for public investment despite rising oil revenues. Public debt is expected to moderate to 44.6 per cent of GDP in 2026, declining further to 43.4 per cent in 2027. The current account balance is projected to increase to -6.4 per cent of GDP in 2026, narrowing to -4.1 per cent in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

Niger's heavy reliance on the oil sector leaves it highly exposed to fluctuations in global oil prices, operational disruptions (including pipeline tensions with neighbouring Benin), and governance challenges in resource management. Niger faces persistent insecurity and political uncertainty, which disrupts economic activity, deters investment, and increases fiscal pressures through security spending. Again, the country's dependence on external financing may be constrained by geopolitical developments and reduced aid flows.





NIGERIA



Macroeconomic Performance

Nigeria's real GDP growth slowed marginally to 4.0 per cent in 2025, with oil production rebounding, improved domestic refining capacity, and strong expansion in services and non-oil sectors. Average inflation decelerated to 23.0 per cent, reflecting easing food price pressures and tighter monetary policy. The fiscal balance worsened marginally to -1.8 per cent of GDP, as expenditure growth (15.5%) outstripped revenue growth (9.7%). Public debt declined to 35.5 per cent of GDP, although debt servicing pressures remained high due to weak revenue mobilisation. Nigeria's current account balance remained in surplus, albeit declining to 5.1 per cent of GDP in 2025, supported by higher oil exports, reduced fuel import bills due to domestic refining, and increased non-oil exports.


Outlook

Nigeria's economy is projected to grow to 4.1 per cent and 4.4 per cent in 2026 and 2027, respectively, supported by sustained reforms, higher oil production, increased domestic refining capacity, and continued expansion in services and non-oil sectors. Inflation is expected to ease significantly but remain elevated, declining to an average of 15.3 per cent in 2026

and further to 14.1 per cent in 2027, on the back of tighter monetary policy, exchange rate stabilisation, and gradually easing supply constraints. Fiscal performance is projected to deteriorate to -3.7 per cent of GDP, driven by high domestic and local prices, even in the face of subsidy reforms and improved oil receipts. Public debt is projected to decline to 33.5 per cent of GDP in 2026, before inching up marginally to 34.1 per cent in 2027. The current account balance is expected to improve to 5.4 per cent of GDP in 2026, before narrowing to 2.7 per cent in 2027, supported by higher oil exports, reduced fuel imports due to local refining, and growing non-oil exports.

Probable Headwinds

Nigeria's continued dependence on oil revenues exposes its fiscal balances, export earnings, and overall growth to volatility in global oil prices and production disruptions. The war in the Middle East risks maintaining Nigeria's inflation elevated, in addition to structural supply bottlenecks, food insecurity, and exchange rate pressures. Fiscal risks also persist, as low revenue mobilisation and high debt service burdens constrain fiscal space and limit the government's ability to sustain investment and social spending, despite ongoing reforms.



SENEGAL



Macroeconomic Performance

Senegal's economy recorded a robust growth of 7.9 per cent, helped by the expansion of oil and gas output, a rebound in agriculture, and continued activity in construction and services. Average inflation remained subdued within the WAEMU band, though it increased to 1.4 per cent in 2025, up from 0.8 per cent in 2024. The fiscal balance remained elevated but eased to -7.9 per cent of GDP over the period, down from -13.4 per cent in 2024, as revenue grew by 14.5 per cent and expenditure declined by 5.8 per cent. Public debt declined marginally to 130.2 per cent of GDP, down from 132.4 per cent in 2024, on the back of the strong GDP growth, while the current account balance narrowed to -5.6 per cent of GDP, from -11.3 per cent in 2024, reflecting higher export earnings from new oil and gas production, partly offset by continued import demand for investment goods.


Outlook

The Senegalese economy is projected to slow to a growth of 4.1 per cent in 2026, reflecting normalisation after the initial surge from oil and gas production, as well as the impact of tighter macroeconomic policies and elevated debt burdens. The economy will rebound to a growth of 5.7 per cent in 2027. Average inflation is projected to increase to 2.1 per cent in 2026, anchored

on the WAEMU monetary framework, in spite of price pressures, before declining marginally to 2.0 per cent in 2027. Fiscal balance is projected to remain on a declining path, in line with efforts to contain new debt accumulation, decreasing to -6.7 per cent of GDP in 2026 and -5.7 per cent in 2027, respectively. Public debt will also continue to decline marginally to 129.2 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 126.4 per cent in 2027. The current account balance is projected to worsen to -6.7 per cent of GDP in 2026 before narrowing to -6.1 per cent in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

Senegal's very high public debt burden constrains fiscal space and necessitates difficult consolidation measures that could dampen economic activity. Large fiscal deficits could limit public investment and social spending, potentially affecting growth and welfare. Furthermore, the country remains vulnerable to sizeable current account deficits and reliance on external financing, reflecting continued import demand, particularly for capital goods, despite rising hydrocarbon exports. Moreover, the economy is exposed to commodity price volatility and uncertainty in oil and gas production, with any delays or weaker-than-expected output potentially significantly affecting fiscal revenues and export earnings.





SIERRA LEONE



Macroeconomic Performance

Sierra Leone's real GDP grew modestly to 4.4 per cent, driven primarily by stronger performance in agriculture (notably under the Feed Salone initiative), services such as trade, and continued though mixed mining activity, with private investment and household consumption also contributing on the demand side. Average inflation declined sharply to 7.6 per cent, down from 28.4 per cent, a testament to tighter monetary policy, exchange rate stabilisation, and improved domestic food supply conditions. Fiscal balance improved by 100 basis points to -4.2 per cent of GDP in 2025, supported by expenditure restraint and ongoing reforms to strengthen public financial management, with the debt-to-GDP ratio declining to 45.2 per cent over the period. The current account balance improved markedly to 5.1 per cent of GDP, financed by grants and export earnings from minerals.


Outlook

In 2026, Sierra Leone's economy is projected to grow by 4.6 per cent, growing further by 4.9 per cent in 2027, helped by sustained expansion in agriculture, recovery in services, and a gradual pickup in mining activity. Average inflation is expected to stabilise at 7.6

per cent in 2026, before declining marginally to 7.5 per cent in 2027, keeping inflation firmly in single digits. Fiscal balance is expected to continue to narrow to -2.2 per cent of GDP in 2026, before reaching -0.2 per cent in 2027, as revenue mobilisation improves and expenditure discipline is maintained. Public debt will continue to ease to 42.7 per cent of GDP in 2026 and further to 39.2 per cent in 2027, supported by fiscal adjustment and growth, with the current account balance easing to -3.1 per cent of GDP in 2026 and -2.6 per cent in 2027.

Probable Headwinds

Sierra Leone is highly vulnerable to external shocks, particularly fluctuations in global commodity prices, given its reliance on mining exports such as iron ore and diamonds, which can affect fiscal revenues, export earnings, and overall growth. Although inflation has declined, macroeconomic stability remains fragile, with lingering risks of exchange rate pressures and renewed price volatility that could erode gains in purchasing power and poverty reduction. In addition, Sierra Leone is highly exposed to climate-related risks, including erratic rainfall and extreme weather events, which can disrupt agricultural output and food security in an economy heavily dependent on subsistence farming.



TOGO



Macroeconomic Performance

Togo's real GDP growth slowed to 5.9 per cent in 2025, with private investment, household consumption, and strong performance in industry and agriculture supporting growth. Average inflation decelerated to 0.4 per cent, from 2.9 per cent in 2024, benefiting from easing food and energy prices and the stability provided by the WAEMU monetary framework. Fiscal balance eased markedly to -3.2 per cent of GDP in 2025, from -6.8 per cent in 2024, primarily as a result of a significant decline in overall expenditure. Public debt eased to 63.0 per cent of GDP, supported by fiscal adjustment and improved debt management under the IMF-supported program. The current account balance narrowed to -1.0 per cent of GDP, reflecting improved export earnings.


Outlook

Togo's economy is projected to moderate slightly to 5.3 per cent in 2026 before strengthening marginally to 5.4 per cent in 2027, supported by ongoing structural reforms, private investment and steady expansion in services and agriculture. Inflation is expected to inch up to 1.6 per cent in 2026 and 2027 due to expected high energy and food prices. Fiscal balance is expected to widen to -6.7 per cent of GDP

in 2026, before narrowing to -3.0 per cent in 2027. The widening deficit in 2026 primarily reflects fuel price subsidies and increased prices over the period. Public debt is projected to increase to 65.2 per cent of GDP in 2026, in response to the worsening fiscal deficit, before narrowing to 63.7 per cent in 2027. The current account balance is projected to worsen to -3.4 per cent of GDP in 2026, before easing to -3.0 per cent in 2027, driven by continued import demand linked to investment and consumption despite stable export performance.

Probable Headwinds

Togo is exposed to external shocks, particularly from weaker global demand and geopolitical tensions, which can affect exports, investment flows, and overall economic momentum. Furthermore, regional security risks, especially spillovers from instability in the Sahel, could disrupt trade corridors, increase security-related spending, and deter private investment. Public debt remains elevated, and refinancing risks persist, particularly due to reliance on relatively short-term domestic and regional financing, which could increase vulnerability to tightening financial conditions.





BANQUE D'INVESTISSEMENT ET DE DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA CEDEAO
ECOWAS BANK FOR INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
BANCO DE INVESTIMENTO E DE DESENVOLVIMENTO DA CEDEAO

ANNEXURES

Annex 1: West African Groupings

West Africa	ECOWAS	West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)	West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)	WAMZ+	AES
Benin	Benin	Benin	The Gambia	WAMZ Member States	Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso	Cabo Verde	Burkina Faso	Ghana	Cabo Verde	Mali
Cabo Verde	Côte d'Ivoire	Côte d'Ivoire	Guinea		Niger
Côte d'Ivoire	The Gambia	Guinea-Bissau	Liberia		
The Gambia	Ghana	Mali	Nigeria		
Ghana	Guinea	Niger	Sierra Leone		
Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Senegal			
Guinea-Bissau	Liberia	Togo			
Liberia	Nigeria				
Mali	Senegal				
Niger	Sierra Leone				
Nigeria	Togo				
Senegal					
Sierra Leone					
Togo					



Annex 2: Real GDP Growth and Average Inflation

Country	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
	Real GDP Growth (%)					Average Inflation (%)				
Benin	6.4	7.5	7.5	7.1	6.5	2.7	1.2	1.1	1.7	1.5
Burkina Faso	3.0	4.8	5.0	5.0	5.1	0.9	4.2	-0.5	1.9	1.9
Cabo Verde	4.8	7.2	5.5	4.8	5.1	3.7	1.1	2.3	2.1	1.9
Côte d'Ivoire	6.6	6.0	6.5	6.3	6.3	4.4	3.4	0.1	1.9	1.7
The Gambia	5.9	5.6	6.0	5.2	5.4	17.0	11.6	7.9	5.5	5.2
Ghana	3.1	5.8	6.0	5.1	5.3	39.2	22.9	14.2	4.3	4.1
Guinea	6.2	6.1	6.7	8.7	9.1	5.4	4.5	3.1	4.3	4.1
Guinea-Bissau	5.2	4.8	5.5	4.8	5.0	7.2	3.7	0.9	1.9	1.7
Liberia	4.6	4.0	5.1	5.1	5.5	10.1	8.2	8.3	5.6	5.1
Mali	4.7	5.0	4.9	5.7	5.7	2.1	3.2	2.3	1.8	1.6
Niger	2.4	10.3	6.9	6.9	6.7	3.7	9.1	-4.6	0.7	1.1
Nigeria	3.3	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.4	24.7	33.2	23.0	15.3	14.1
Senegal	4.3	6.1	7.9	4.1	5.7	5.9	0.8	1.4	2.1	2.0
Sierra Leone	5.7	4.3	4.4	4.6	4.9	47.7	28.4	7.6	7.6	7.5
Togo	6.2	6.3	5.9	5.3	5.4	5.3	2.9	0.4	1.6	1.6
West Africa	3.8	4.7	4.8	4.7	4.9	21.4	25.3	16.8	11.1	10.2
ECOWAS	3.8	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.9	22.7	26.7	18.0	11.8	10.8
WAEMU	5.2	6.3	6.4	5.8	6.0	3.8	3.3	0.2	1.8	1.7
WAMZ+	3.4	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.7	25.9	31.0	21.1	13.5	12.5
AES	3.5	6.4	5.5	5.8	5.8	2.1	5.1	-0.5	1.5	1.6

Source: West African Development Outlook

Annex 3: Fiscal Balance and Public Debt

Country	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
	Fiscal Balance (% of GDP)					Public Debt (% of GDP)				
Benin	-4.1	-3.1	-2.9	-3.1	-2.9	61.3	60.5	57.3	56.9	55.1
Burkina Faso	-6.9	-5.8	-3.5	-3.6	-3.0	56.8	57.2	52.0	49.0	47.6
Cabo Verde	-0.3	-1.1	1.1	-0.9	0.0	117.5	112.8	101.0	96.2	91.5
Côte d'Ivoire	-5.1	-4.0	-3.0	-3.1	-3.0	56.7	59.5	56.3	54.8	53.3
The Gambia	-3.6	-4.0	-2.9	-1.5	-0.4	77.4	78.5	73.9	66.9	60.8
Ghana	-3.4	-6.2	-1.3	-2.1	-1.8	79.1	70.3	48.8	48.1	45.7
Guinea	-3.9	-5.0	-7.0	-5.0	-4.2	39.8	48.3	48.1	44.1	40.5
Guinea-Bissau	-8.2	-7.3	-6.7	-4.0	-3.5	79.4	82.4	75.3	73.5	71.7
Liberia	-8.5	-1.8	-1.4	-1.6	-1.1	57.2	56.4	54.9	54.0	53.8
Mali	-3.0	-2.2	-1.6	-2.4	-2.3	44.3	44.0	41.9	40.8	39.5
Niger	-5.4	-4.3	-3.3	-3.7	-3.0	51.8	47.7	45.4	44.6	43.4
Nigeria	-3.1	-1.3	-1.8	-3.7	-2.9	36.3	39.3	35.5	33.5	34.1
Senegal	-14.8	-13.4	-7.9	-6.7	-5.7	118.4	132.4	130.2	129.2	126.4
Sierra Leone	-5.0	-5.2	-4.2	-2.2	-0.2	49.4	46.7	45.2	42.7	39.2
Togo	-6.3	-6.8	-3.2	-6.7	-3.0	64.1	66.2	63.0	65.2	63.7
West Africa	-4.0	-3.7	-2.6	-3.5	-2.9	48.5	55.3	49.3	45.9	45.0
ECOWAS	-3.8	-2.6	-2.2	-3.6	-2.9	46.0	48.3	43.2	41.4	41.2
WAEMU	-6.5	-5.4	-3.7	-3.8	-3.3	64.7	67.5	64.6	63.1	61.1
WAMZ+	-3.2	-2.0	-1.9	-3.5	-2.8	41.6	43.5	37.8	36.0	36.0
AES	-4.9	-4.0	-2.7	-3.2	-2.7	50.5	49.4	46.2	44.6	43.2

Source: West African Development Outlook



Annex 4: Current Account Balance

Country	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027
	Current Account Balance (% of GDP)				
Benin	-8.2	-6.0	-5.7	-5.2	-5.1
Burkina Faso	-5.1	-3.5	6.7	9.1	9.1
Cabo Verde	-2.8	3.9	3.6	-0.4	-1.3
Côte d'Ivoire	-8.0	-4.5	-1.1	-1.1	-3.3
The Gambia	-5.4	-6.5	-5.0	-5.3	-4.7
Ghana	-0.8	1.8	7.9	10.7	10.0
Guinea	-9.7	-14.7	-22.3	-3.6	0.1
Guinea-Bissau	-8.6	-7.4	-6.2	-6.7	-5.4
Liberia	-20.1	-8.1	-6.3	-12.7	-12.4
Mali	-6.5	-4.3	-0.8	-1.6	1.7
Niger	-13.9	-5.6	-5.0	-6.4	-4.1
Nigeria	1.3	6.8	5.1	5.4	2.7
Senegal	-19.8	-11.3	-5.6	-6.7	-6.1
Sierra Leone	-9.5	-6.9	-5.1	-3.1	-2.6
Togo	-3.8	-2.4	-1.0	-3.4	-3.0
West Africa	-2.2	0.3	1.8	3.2	1.8
ECOWAS	-1.7	0.9	2.0	3.4	1.8
WAEMU	-9.6	-5.5	-1.7	-1.8	-1.9
WAMZ+	0.3	3.8	3.8	5.6	3.7
AES	-8.0	-4.4	0.6	0.9	2.7

Source: West African Development Outlook

Annex 5: A Breakdown of Unemployment in West Africa

Grouping	Country	2024	2025	2026	2027
West Africa		5.58	5.60	6.02	6.27
	Benin	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
	Cabo Verde	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	Côte d'Ivoire	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.33
	The Gambia	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
	Ghana	0.37	0.39	0.42	0.43
	Guinea	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25
	Guinea-Bissau	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	Liberia	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	Nigeria	3.45	3.57	3.72	3.91
	Senegal	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18
	Sierra Leone	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10
	Togo	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08
ECOWAS		4.94	5.13	5.34	5.58
	Benin	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
	Burkina Faso	0.33	0.17	0.36	0.37
	Côte d'Ivoire	0.29	0.30	0.32	0.33
	Guinea-Bissau	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
	Mali	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
	Niger	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
	Senegal	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.18
	Togo	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08
WAEMU		1.28	1.14	1.37	1.42
	Cabo Verde	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	The Gambia	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06
	Ghana	0.37	0.39	0.42	0.43
	Guinea	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25
	Liberia	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	Nigeria	3.45	3.57	3.72	3.91
	Sierra Leone	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10
WAMZ+		4.30	4.46	4.64	4.85
	Burkina Faso	0.33	0.17	0.36	0.37
	Mali	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26
	Niger	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05
AES		0.63	0.47	0.67	0.69

Source: EBID Staff construct, based on ILO Modelled Estimates



Annex 6: Growth in Labour Productivity

Grouping	Country	2024	2025	2026	2027
West Africa Growth		1.70	1.60	1.90	1.80
ECOWAS	Benin	4.3	3.8	3.5	3.4
	Cabo Verde	5.7	3.6	3.3	3.4
	Côte d'Ivoire	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.5
	The Gambia	2.2	2.9	2.1	2.0
	Ghana	3.1	2.6	3.2	3.1
	Guinea	3.0	4.5	7.6	7.8
	Guinea-Bissau	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0
	Liberia	1.1	1.7	2.5	2.5
	Nigeria	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.2
	Senegal	3.3	2.4	-	0.2
	Sierra Leone	1.6	2.0	2.5	2.3
	Togo	2.4	2.5	2.8	2.8
ECOWAS Growth		1.6	1.6	1.9	1.8
WAEMU	Benin	4.3	3.8	3.5	3.4
	Burkina Faso	2.9	0.7	1.5	1.5
	Côte d'Ivoire	2.8	3.2	3.3	3.5
	Guinea-Bissau	1.8	2.0	2.0	2.0
	Mali	1.1	1.5	1.9	1.7
	Niger	6.0	2.3	2.5	2.4
	Senegal	3.3	2.4	-0.2	0.2
	Togo	2.4	2.5	2.8	2.8
WAEMU Growth		2.6	2.5	2.3	2.4
WAMZ+	Cabo Verde	5.7	3.6	3.3	3.4
	The Gambia	2.2	2.9	2.1	2.0
	Ghana	3.1	2.6	3.2	3.1
	Guinea	3.0	4.5	7.6	7.8
	Liberia	1.1	1.7	2.5	2.5
	Nigeria	1.1	1.0	1.4	1.2
	Sierra Leone	1.6	2.0	2.5	2.3
WAMZ+ Growth		1.4	1.3	1.8	1.6
AES	Burkina Faso	2.9	0.7	1.5	1.5
	Mali	1.1	1.5	1.9	1.7
	Niger	6.0	2.3	2.5	2.4
AES Growth		3.0	1.5	1.9	1.8

Source: EBID Staff construct, based on ILO Modelled Estimates



2026

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